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I. Introduction
September 11, 2001 is a day that will be etched in the hearts of
Americans forever. From 8:14 A.M., when the first plane was
hijacked, until 10:28 A.M., when the North Tower of the World
Trade Center collapsed, America was under attack. Addressing the
nation, President Bush described the target of the attack as "[the
American] way of life, our very freedom."' The President told the
t B.A. Psychology, University of North Carolina, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of
North Carolina School of Law, 2013.
1 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks (Sept.
11, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2001-09-
17/pdf/WCPD-2001-09-17-Pgl301-2.pdf).
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American people, "Our country is strong. A great people has been
moved to defend a great nation."2 While the attack lasted only a
few hours, nearly 3,000 lives were lost, leaving wounds that would
take years to heal.3
The attacks had a psychological effect on Americans; 9/11
shaped the American perception of national security for years to
come, causing many to view national security as the country's
greatest concern.' Soon after 9/11, the United States responded by
invading Afghanistan in search of Osama bin Laden.'
For the last decade, the paradigm of national security has been
shaped by a fear of another similar attack from an enemy abroad.6
At the same time, however, another decades old national security
threat was gaining prominence:' a threat that does not fit into the
traditional national security paradigm of the last decade.'
2 Id
3 See Official 9/11 Death Toll Climbs by One, CBSNEWS (Sept. 10, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/10/national/main4250100.shtml.
4 See Clem Brooks, Kyle Dodson & Nikole Hotchkiss, National Security Issues
and US Presidential Elections, 1992-2008, 39 Soc. Sci. RES. 518, 519 (2010) (stating
that, according to the linkage thesis, in the "2004 presidential election .... national
security-related issues mattered considerably, giving the incumbent president a
considerable advantage from the start of the campaign through the general election"); id.
at 525 ("National security-related issues were central to voter choice in 2008.").
5 See Interactive: U.S. War in Afghanistan: Tracking a War, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018 (click
to begin, then click "next" until the heading reads October 07, 2001) (last visited Jan. 17,
2013) (stating that on October 7, 2001, the U.S. in alliance with few European countries
began bombing Afghanistan).
6 See CIA, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 4-10 (2003)
(describing the structure of global terrorist groups, their functioning, and their respective
threats), available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/
CounterTerrorismStrategy.pdf.
7 See, e.g., OFFICE OF NAT'L COUNTER INTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES
STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN
ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, 2009-2011 6-11 (2011) [hereinafter
OFFICE OF NAT'L COUNTER INTELLIGENCE EXEC.], available at http://www.ncix.gov/
publications/reports/fecie all/ForeignEconomicCollection_2011 .pdf (describing the
evolving cyber environment, the emergence of new threats to the United States, and the
role private parties play in the cyberspace environment).
8 See G. JOHN IKENBERRY & ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, FORGING A WORLD OF
LIBERTY UNDER LAW: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT OF
THE PRINCETON PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY 2 (The Princeton Project Papers, The
Woodrow Wilson Sch. of Pub. & Int'l Affairs, Princeton Univ. 2006), available at
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Curiously, it is a threat many Americans often overlook.9 The
threat jeopardizes the informational security of the nation.'o
In the last few years, newspapers have exposed many foreign
nationals hacking U.S. companies and government offices to
obtain private information and government secrets." In similar
fashion, foreign governments and foreign companies, through the
use of mergers and buyouts of American companies, have gained
access to private information and government secrets.12 To protect
the United States against such threats, Congress established the
Committee on Foreign Direct Investment (CFIUS) in the 1970s.'
Most recently, Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications
equipment company, has tested CFIUS through two mergers, one
attempted and one actualized. In 2008, Huawei, alleged to have
close ties with the People's Liberation Army, attempted to buy out
3Com, a company that supplies technology that protects the
http://www.princeton.edu/-ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf.
9 See, e.g., Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical
Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 403, 407 (2007) ("Despite the
magnitude of this threat, the United States currently operates under the presumption that
a cyber attack constitutes a criminal activity, not a threat to national security.").
10 OFFICE OF NAT'L COUNTER INTELLIGENCE EXEC., supra note 7, at 1-2, 7-10
(emphasis added).
11 E.g., Siobhan Gorman, China Hackers Hit U.S. Chamber, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21,
2011, at Al, A4 (detailing how Chinese nationals, potentially having close ties to the
Chinese government, hacked the U.S. Chamber); Kenneth Rapoza, On China and Russia
Hacking Into U.S., "No Hard Feelings," FORBES, Nov. 8, 2011,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/11/08/on-china-and-russia-hacking-into-us-
no-hard-feelings/ (discussing China and Russia's incentive to hack U.S. companies for
their intellectual property).
12 See Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Jurisdiction Under the FSIA,
II U. PA. J. Bus. L. 967, 984 (2009) ("' [O]ne of the nation's largest unions, SEIU
(Service Employees International Union), calls for stronger federal oversight of
arrangements where foreign government-controlled investment funds, known as
"sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)," buy into private firms that own or invest in American
companies responsible for defense, energy, and homeland security."' (quoting Press
Release, Service Employees International Union, America for Sale? (July 23, 2008),
available at http://www.seiu.org/2008/07/america-for-sale.php)).
13 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 4 (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf (stating that CFIUS was created to assist
the President in overseeing the "national security implications of foreign investment on
the economy" (citing Exec. Order No. I 1,858(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (May 7, 1975))).
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Pentagon from cyber attacks.14 More recently, Huawei was
scrutinized for its acquisition of 3Leaf, a company that services
internet servers in the United States.'5  Huawei boldly acquired
3Leaf in the face of much government opposition and was asked
ex post facto to divest from the assets it had already purchased.16
With companies like Huawei bravely challenging the
effectiveness of the U.S. national security system, one has to
question if the regulatory framework of CFIUS is effective to
combat mergers that jeopardize national security. The goal of this
note is to analyze how Huawei's recent merger illustrates potential
flaws in CFIUS." Ultimately, this note recommends the
incorporation of a "list method." This method would require pre-
approval and early notification to certain private sector companies
vital to national security and would serve as a more efficient and
effective system of governance for CFIUS."
Part I of this note outlines the controversial history that shaped
the evolution of CFIUS; Part II discusses Huawei's recent
attempts to acquire U.S. companies; Part III analyzes how
Huawei's merger attempts to illustrate flaws in CFIUS's function
and suggests solutions for these flaws.
II. History of CFIUS
A. Origin of the Fujistu-Fairchild Incident
CFIUS was created in the 1970s in reaction to the increased
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States by oil rich
nations.' 9 Congress grew weary of the large amounts of capital
14 Bruce Einhorn, Huawei's 3Com Deal Flops, BLOOMBERG Bus. WK. (Feb. 21,
2008), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/eyeonasia/archives/2008/02/hua
weis_3com de.html; Richard Mcgregor et al., Huawei-3Com Deal Finally Collapses
Amid U.S. Opposition, FIN. TIMES, (March 22, 2008), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/c2091814-f6b5-11 dc-bdal-000077b07658.html#axzzlmWOTDXvL
(subscription required).
15 John Leyden, Huawei Drops 3Leaf Buy: Capitol Hill Says No, THE REG., (Feb.
21, 2011), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/21/huawei 3leaf dealdropped/.
16 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Huawei U-turn on US. Deal Saves Blushes, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/28cle442-3d20-11eO-bbff-00144fea
bdcO.html.
17 See infra Part III.
18 See infra Part Ill.
19 See Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States Investment
958 Vol. XXXVIII
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flowing into the country, and in response, President Gerald Ford,
via Executive Order 11, 858 established CFIUS to "monitor[] the
impact of foreign investment in the United States."20 Chaired by
the Secretary of Treasury, the eight-member CFIUS committee
was tasked with "review[ing] investments in the United States . . .
that might have major implications for United States national
interests."2' As originally created, CFIUS had no power to block
investments even if the investments presented a national security
threat to the United States.22
In the five years after its inception, the CFIUS committee met
only ten times. 23  Political pressure-mainly the Executive
Branch's inability to prove that FDI did not present a threat to the
United States-may have contributed to the general lack of action
taken by the committee. 24 A combination of Reaganomics, which
encouraged FD, 25 and the lack of regulation controlling FDI, led
to a five-fold increase in these types of investments from 1980 to
1989.26
CFIUS drew national attention in 1986, ending its passive
approach towards enforcing its own goals.2 7 In 1986, Fujitsu Ltd.,
a Japanese computer manufacturer, sought to buy Fairchild
Semiconductor Corp., a company that had supply contracts with
U.S. defense contractors.2 8 Many "feared losing the technological
Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards ofExon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1989).
20 Exec. Order No. 11,858, §1(b) 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975), amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1981).
21 Id.
22 See Paul 1. Djuristic, Comment, The Exon-Florio Amendment: National Security
Legislation Hampered by Political and Economic Forces, 3 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 179, 183
(1991).
23 See Matthew C. Sullivan, CFIUS and Congress Reconsidered: Fire Alarms,
Police Patrols, and a New Oversight Regime, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL.
199,211 (2009).
24 Id. at 211-12.
25 See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 20 (Institute for International Economics, 2006),
available at http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters-preview/3918/01iie39I8.pdf
(recalling that President Reagan, as compared to President Carter, welcomed direct
investment in the United States as a part of his economic strategy).
26 See Djuristic, supra note 22, at 183.
27 Id. at 183-84.
28 See JACKSON, supra note 13, at 4 ("The proposed Fairchild acquisition generated
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edge to the Japanese" and feared that the United States would have
no other comparable microchip manufacturers if a Japanese
company purchased Fairchild Semiconductor.29 If Fairchild
Semiconductor Corp. were acquired, U.S. defense manufacturers
would be dependent on a foreign company to acquire quality
computer chips.3 0 In response to those fears, CFIUS initiated a
review of the potential acquisition. In the face of intense national
attention, Fujitsu Ltd. withdrew its offer.3'
This purported acquisition highlighted a major weakness with
CFIUS and the President's power: while the Executive branch
could review transactions under CFIUS, it had no power to stop
them.32 The Fujistu-Fairchild incident signaled to Congress that
CFIUS needed to change in order to protect the United States;
thus, the incident inspired the passage of the Exon-Florio
Amendment, discussed below.
B. From Exon-Florio to the Byrd Amendment
Section 5021 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, commonly known as the Exon-Florio Amendment,
significantly expanded presidential power to regulate foreign
investments in the United States.3 3 The amendment gave the
President the express power to block any investment where "there
is credible evidence" leading him to believe that the investing
intense concern in Congress in part because of general difficulties in trade relations with
Japan at that time and because some Americans felt that the United States was declining
as an international economic power as well as a world power. The Defense Department
opposed the acquisition because some officials believed that the deal would give Japan
control over a major supplier of computer chips for the military and would make U.S.
defense industries more dependent on foreign suppliers for sophisticated high-
technology products.").
29 Djuristic, supra note 22, at 184; see Edward Graham & Michael Ebert, Foreign
Direct Investment and U.S. National Security: Fixing Exon-Florio, 14 THE WORLD
ECON. 245, 249 (1991) ("[S]urging foreign acquisitions ... were steadily eroding the US
defence industrial base if not non-defence American 'competitiveness."').
30 See JACKSON, supra note 13, at 4 (explaining this dependency as a feared result).
31 See Stephen K. Pudner, Comment, Moving Forward From Dubai Ports World-
The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1277, 1279
(2007-2008).
32 See id
33 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§5021, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §2170).
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company may "take action that threatens to impair . .. national
security."34 The amendment also required the President to explain
to Congress whenever he determined that a particular transaction
should be stopped pursuant to the power granted in the
amendment." Following the amendment, President Reagan
delegated the authority invested in him by the amendment to
CFIUS through Executive Order 12,661.36
The Exon-Florio Amendment that passed was not as strong as
the original proposal." While the Exon-Florio Amendment was
intended to repair CFIUS and increase Presidential power, it did
not go far enough. The flaws and holes of CFIUS were revealed
within a year of the enactment of Exon-Florio during the
Thomson-LTV incident.38
In 1992, a French government-owned corporation, Thomson-
CSF, sought to acquire LTV Steel's Missile Division, a U.S.
company that had defense contracts with the Department of
Defense.39 In this case, a large portion of the transaction was
completed prior to seeking CFIUS approval.4 0 After CFIUS
initiated the investigation, Thomson-CSF and the Department of
Defense failed to reach terms on how the United States could be
protected by the merger, resulting in the Department of Defense
recommending that the transaction not occur.41 As pressure
mounted from the Department of Defense and Capitol Hill,42
34 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 2170(d)(4) (2007).
35 See id at §2170(b)(3).
36 See Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988); Matthew R. Byrne, Note,
Protecting National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintaining the Exon-
Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 865 & n.95 (2006).
37 See Graham & Ebert, supra note 29, at 248 (stating that the Amendment
introduced by Rep. James Florio granted the President power to block any transaction
threaten to U.S. "national security and essential commerce."); see also Alvarez, supra
note 19, at 64-68 (noting that the original bill faced much criticism, with many citing the
bill as too broad and far reaching).
38 See Byrne, supra note 36, at 872-73.
39 See id
40 See id at 873.
41 See id at 873-74 (citing Robert N. Cappucci, Note, Amending the Treatment of
Defense Production Enterprise Under the U.S. Exon-Florio Provision: A Move Toward
Protectionism or Globalism?, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 653, 667-68 (1993)).
42 See id. at 873-74 (stating that pressure accumulated from Thomson's
competitors and hearings on Capitol Hill; opposition was also induced because
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Thompson-CSF withdrew its bid for LTV's Missile Division.4 3
Despite Thomson-CSF's withdrawal, many were concerned
with how this situation was handled and desired to make sure
"such deals were properly vetted in the future."4 4 The Thomson-
LTV incident was managed in a cloud of secrecy, with CFIUS
denying access to information due to confidentiality agreements. 4 5
The covert nature of the CFIUS review process created many
conflicting reports regarding Thomson-CSF's withdrawal. 46 Thus,
the Thomson-LTV incident inspired Congress to pass the Byrd
Amendment.
C. From the Byrd Amendment to the Foreign Investment and
National Security Act of2007
The Byrd Amendment, Section 837(a) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1993,47 sought to strengthen
CFIUS by expanding its reach.48  Unlike the Exon-Florio
Amendment, which allowed CFIUS to opt out of an investigation,
the Byrd Amendment required CFIUS to investigate in virtually
all circumstances.4 9 More specifically, the Byrd Amendment
mandated investigation "in any instance in which an entity
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to
engage in any merger, acquisition, or takeover" that affects
national security.so
Additionally, the amendment increased the President's
reporting requirements. Under the Exon-Florio Amendment, the
President only had to report to Congress when he rejected a deal.'
"Thompson had provided Iraq with radar equipment for use during the Persian Gulf
War").
43 See id at 874.
44 See Pudner, supra note 31, at 1281.
45 See Bryne, supra note 36, at 873-74.
46 See id
47 See Pudner, supra note 31, at 1281.
48 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-




51 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 2170(b)(3), (d)(2)
(2007) (requiring the President to report to Congress upon taking such action).
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However, the Byrd Amendment required the President to send a
report to Congress in any instance CFIUS completed a full
investigation and to the parties who did not withdraw from the
transaction.52 Consequently, Congress would have more
information regarding the CFIUS committee's actions, which
reduces some of the concern created by the Thomson-LTV
situation.
The law stood still for almost fourteen years before the next set
of amendments regulating CFIUS came into effect.5 3 The
amendments were inspired by two proposed takeovers: CNOOC's
bid of Unocal and Dubai Ports World's bid for Peninsular and
Oriental Steam Navigation Co. (P&O). 54
1. CNOOC-UNOCAL Deal
CNOOC is one of China's largest oil producers, with much of
its business engaging in the "exploration, development, production
and sales of oil and natural gas."" Similar to CNOOC, Unocal
was in the business of energy exploration, having a multinational
business model. Seeing a good fit for its growth strategy,
CNOOC made a $18.5 billion bid for Unocal in June of 2005.
Many in the United States did not welcome the proposed bid, and
Congress soon passed resolutions to cut funding to departments
that would recommend approving the transaction." Many feared
that if the acquisition went through, communist China would gain
52 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, § 837 (1992)
(amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g) (2007)).
53 See, e.g., infra Part II.D (detailing the amendments enacted in 2007).
54 See infra Part II.C. I.
55 CNOOC LIMITED, http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/aboutus/default.shtm
(last visited Jan 24, 2013).
56 Douglas Sun, Gale Directory of Company H-istories: Unocal Corporation,
ANSWERS, http://www.answers.com/topic/unocal-corporation-l?cat=biz-fin (last visited
Jan. 24, 2013).
57 David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil Giant in Takeover Bidfor
US. Company, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at Al.
58 See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 220-21; see also GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, YEE
WONG & KETKI SHETH, US-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: RISING TIDE, RISING STAKES 47-48
(Institute for International Economics, 2006), available at http://www.piie.com/
publications/chapters_preview/3942/05iie3942.pdf (describing the United States
governments reaction to the proposed CNOOC-Unocal transaction).
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control of an American company with large oil reserves.5 9 Much
of the opposition to this transaction stemmed from three key facts:
"CNOOC is a foreign company; the Chinese government controls
it; and it has the unfair advantage of financial support from the
Chinese government." 60  "[C]iting unprecedented political
opposition ... creating a level of uncertainty that present[ed] an
unacceptable risk to our ability to secure this transaction,"6'
CNOOC withdrew its bid for Unocal.6 2
Notably, CNOOC's withdrawal came from congressional
pressure rather than CFIUS's review. Due to CFIUS's inaction,
Congress passed some legislation calling for
a one-time study "of the growing energy requirements of the
People's Republic of China and the implications of such growth
on the political, strategic, economic, or national security
interests of the United States." The legislation allowed for 120
days for the report to be completed and presented to the
president and Congress. Not until 21 days after the report was
presented could a US [sic] organization that reviews investment
in a domestic corporation "conclude a national security review
related to an investment in the energy assets of a United States
domestic corporation by an entity owned or controlled by the
government of the People's Republic of China," thereby
immobilizing the review process under way in the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) with respect to
the proposed CNOOC-Unocal deal for a potential 141 additional
days.63
Thus, with a combination of legislation and congressional
scrutiny, CFIUS and the President were spared from making a
decision on "a politically unpopular deal."'
2. Dubai Ports-Peninsular and Oriental Steam
59 See Byrne, supra note 36, at 874-75 (describing concerns "[n]umerous members
of Congress" had with a Chinese company taking control of Unocal).
60 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 58, at 47.
61 Id. at 48 (alteration in original).
62 See id; see also Press Release, CNOOC Ltd., CNOOC Limited to Withdraw
Unocal Bid (Aug. 2, 2005) available at http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/
newszx/news/2005/96 1.shtml.
63 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 58, at 47-48.
64 See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 222.
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Navigation Co. (P&O) Deal
Soon after the CNOOC-Unocal incident, CFIUS was once
again put under scrutiny in October of 2005. Dubai Ports World
(DPW), a United Arab Emirates government-owned company,
sought to buy Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co.
61(P&O), a London based company. P&O managed six major U.S.
ports, most famously the port of New York.66 When the two
companies filed for CFIUS review, "CFIUS did not identify
national security issues in this transaction because DPW would
neither be in charge of the ports themselves nor port security. 67
Rather, it would manage terminal port operations without
acquiring the ports themselves."6 8
The rapid review of the transaction raised questions about
CFIUS's diligence in the review process, with some accusing that
it had overlooked some national security considerations.6 9 Others
questioned the reliability of the DPW, questioning its national ties
with the United Arab Emirates which had a "history as an
operational and financial base for hijackers who carried out the
9/11 attacks." 0 While DPW remained committed to working on
the deal, it eventually succumbed to the political pressure and
negative publicity after several weeks of scrutiny." Notably, the
Dubai Ports incident brought out the weakness of CFIUS.72 It
65 See Eben Kaplan, The UAE purchase of American port facilities, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/port-security/uae-purchase-
american-port-facilities/p9918; see also Maria Goes de Moraes Gavioli, National
Security or Xenophobia: The Impact of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act
("FINSA') in Foreign Investment in the US., 2 WM. MITCHELL L. RAZA J. 1, 20 (2011)
(explaining that P&O was a London-based company).
66 See Associated Press, Bush Backs Transfer of U.S. Ports to Dubai Firm,
MSNBC (Feb. 21, 2006, 11:30 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/l 1474440/ns/us
news-securitv/t/bush-backs-transfer-us-ports-dubai-firm/#.UHzuScWdDiK (listing New
York, New Jersey, Baltimore, New Orleans, Miami, and Philadelphia as "Dubai ports").
67 Gavioli, supra note 65, at 20.
68 Id.
69 See Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World under Exon-Florio: A Threat to
National Security or a Tempest in a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 606 (2007)
(explaining that members of Congress expressed concerns).
70 Gavioli, supra note 65, at 21.
71 See id. (explaining DPW's response given the threatened legislative action from
Congress).
72 See id ("After the DPW incident Congress deemed the CFIUS review under
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showed how port security, even after 9/11, could be compromised
by a lackluster CFIUS review.7 3 Furthermore, it pitted a President
who supported the transaction against a Congress that overtly
opposed it.74 The Dubai Ports incident made national security a
political football, pitting the President and Congress against one
another."
Recognizing the weakness of CFIUS as illuminated by the
Dubai Ports and CNOOC incidents, Congress once again needed
to strengthen CFIUS, and it did so through the Foreign Investment
and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA). 6
D. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007
(FINSA)
With the primary goal of broadening the reach of CFIUS by
expanding the types of transactions covered and by expanding the
definition of national security, President Bush signed FINSA into
law on July 26, 2007.n Interestingly, this was the first time
Congress brought CFIUS directly under a statutory framework,
thus making CIFUS more accountable.
Maira Gavioli summarized the effects of FINSA as:
(1) it expands the concept of national security to include issues
relating to "homeland security"; (2) expands "covered
transaction" to include transactions involving "critical
infrastructure"; (3) includes additional factors that CFIUS might
consider in its assessment of national security threats; (4)
Exon-Florio inadequate to protect national security under the current state of affairs of
terrorist threats.").
73 See id. ("[Critics] further argued that DPW could be influenced by Al-Qaeda
into weakening ports' security.").
74 See id. ("President George W. Bush supported the deal and threatened to veto
any congressional action blocking it.").
75 See id.
76 See Foreign Investment & National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
121 Stat. 246 (codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170) (describing powers granted
to CFIUS).
77 See id.; see also Gavioli, supra note 65, at 22 ("FINSA represents a victory for
congress in the long-running struggle to expand covered transactions, broaden the
national security concept and increase congressional oversight.").
78 See Pudner, supra note 31, at 1282 ("[T]he passage of the Act in 2007 was the
first time that Congress brought CFIUS explicitly under a statutory framework, therefore
adding a measure of stability and accountability previously missing from CFIUS.").
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expressly authorizes CFIUS to require mitigation agreements
and monitor compliance; (5) prohibits notice withdrawals
without CFIUS prior approval; (7) [sic] expands Congressional
access to CFIUS transaction's specific information; and (8)
provides for civil penalties if parties to a transaction violate
FINSA and/or mitigation agreements. The additional factors
that CFIUS can consider in its national security analysis under
FINSA specifically target, inter alia, situations that involve
terrorist-related parties or countries.79
Under FINSA, CFIUS could investigate matters affecting
"'homeland security', [sic] including its application to critical
infrastructure" under the term "national security."s FINSA
defines "critical infrastructure" broadly as "systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital .. . that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating
impact on national security."' To ensure that CFIUS would
review more transactions, Congress specifically listed additional
areas, such as: (1) critical technology, (2) energy, (3) materials, (4)
infrastructure, (5) military goods, and (6) export controls could be
affected by the transaction at issue.82
Additionally, FINSA's definition of covered transactions, in
conjunction with the statutory definition of covered transactions,
expanded CFIUS's power. Post-FINSA, CFIUS can investigate
any transaction that "could result in foreign control of any person
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States."
Furthermore, since "control" is broadly defined by statute as
including any form of "direct or indirect power, through
ownership of voting interests, or any formal or informal
contractual arrangements that would otherwise allow the acquiring
79 See Gavioli, supra note 65, at 22-23 (citations omitted).
80 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(5) (2007).
81 Id. § 2170(a)(6) (2007); see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.208 (2008) ("The term critical
infrastructure means, in the context of a particular covered transaction, a system or asset,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction
of the particular system or asset of the entity over which control is acquired pursuant to
that covered transaction would have a debilitating impact on national security.").
82 See Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the
Commission on Foreign Investment in the U.S., 73 Fed. Reg. 236, 569-70 (Dec. 8,
2008); see also Gavioli, supra note 65, at 24-25 (referencing the same factors).
83 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3).
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company to decide important matters affecting the target entity,"84
CFIUS can target interest gained by foreign entities through stock
purchases as well as mergers and acquisitions.
As of 2007, CFIUS is the broadest, most transparent,
structured, and regulated that it has ever been. The strengthened
CFIUS robustness has been tested, yet little analysis exists to how
CFIUS faired in handling the national security matters. After
2007, CFIUS has been tested by two major incidents, each
presenting different challenges to CFIUS: the Huawei-3Com Deal
and the Huawei-3Leaf Deal.
III.A Modern Test of CFIUS: Huawei-3Com and Huawei-
3Leaf Deals
A. Huawei-3Com
In 2008, Huawei, a Chinese telecommunication equipment
company, partnered with Bain Capital, a U.S. company, to buy
3Com, an American company that built internet routers and
advanced networking materials.8 6 However, unlike previously
discussed transactions, Huawei would only get a minority share of
the company. Issues arose with the transaction because 3Com
made anti-hacking software for the U.S. military, and with Huawei
having strong ties with the Chinese military, U.S. officials feared
that the software falling into Chinese hands would jeopardize the
U.S. military." Even with this fear, Huawei pursued a mitigation
agreement to satisfy CFIUS in order to help Huawei obtain
approval of the transaction.8 9 In the end, Huawei and CFIUS
failed to reach mutual terms, causing Huawei to back out of the
84 See 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a)(1)-(10) (2008) (listing factors CFRUS considers
when determining "control").
85 See Gavioli, supra note 65, at 26 ("This means that not only mergers and
acquisitions are subject to analysis, but also the acquisition of stock interests with voting
rights, forming a joint venture, and the conversion of convertible voting securities.").
86 Steven R. Weisman, Sale of 3Com is Derailed by U.S. Security Concerns, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/business/worldbusiness/
21iht-3com. 1.10258216.html?pagewanted=all.
87 See id.
88 See id.; see also JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE
AND DORR LLP, THE CFIUS REVIEW PROCESS: A REGIME IN FLUX 3-5 (2008) (providing
more details of the threat presented).
89 See Weisman, supra note 86.
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transaction.90
B. Huawei-3Leaf
In 2011, Huawei once again attempted to obtain a U.S.
computer technology company; this time, Huawei proposed a $2
million acquisition of 3Leaf Systems.91 Interestingly, Huawei
attempted to bypass CFIUS altogether with this transaction -
clearly learning from its previous experience during the 3Com
deal.9 2 However, upon learning of the transaction and determining
that it fell within its jurisdiction, CFIUS quickly initiated a review
of the proposed acquisition.93
Within a short period after initiating review, the CFIUS
recommended that Huawei voluntarily divest from 3Leaf.9 4
Unfortunately, by the time of this recommendation, Huawei had
already completed the transaction, "hired 15 3Leaf employees,
own[ed] several former 3Leaf patents and purchased the start-up's
servers out of bankruptcy." 9 5  Upon receiving CFIUS's
recommendation, Huawei refused to back out of the transaction
and intended to force President Obama to decide the matter.96
90 Id.
91 See ScoTT M. FLICKER & DANA M. PARSONS, HUAWEI- CFIUS REDUX: Now IT
GETS INTERESTING 1 (2011), available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/
publications/1 868.pdf.
92 Id. at 1-2 ("Huawei and its advisors reasoned that the purchase of discrete
technology (including patents) and the assumption of less than a third of 3Leafs
employees did not constitute the acquisition of an ongoing 'U.S. Business,' and,
therefore, the acquisition fell outside CFIUS's jurisdiction under the Defense Production
Act."); see also DAVISPOLK, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
REJECTS HUAWEi DEAL; THIRD RECENT CHINESE TRANSACTION SCUTTLED BY NATIONAL
SECURITY REVIEW 1 (2011). Filings with CFIUS are not mandatory, and Huawei and
3Leaf did not notify CFIUS before the acquisition in May and July 2010. Id. Huawei
reportedly acquired intellectual property and key personnel from 3Leaf, but no equity or
physical assets, and the parties concluded that the transaction was not covered because
Huawei did not acquire all of the target's assets. Id
93 See FLICKER & PARSONS, supra note 91, at 1.
94 Shayndi Raice, Panel Likely to Recommend Reversing Huawei Deal, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 11, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052748704629004576
136340771329706.html.
95 See id.
96 See Timothy J. Keeler & Simeon M. Kriesberg, US National Security Review
Disapproves Completed Chinese Acquisition - Huawei Agrees to Withdraw from 3Leaf
Deal, MAYER BROWN (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.mayerbrown.com/
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Huawei's boldness was unprecedented, placing the President in a
very difficult position because he would have had to go "to great
lengths to avoid offending the Chinese government."97
Fortunately for the President, Huawei decided to divest from
3Com before his involvement became necessary. 98
IV. Analysis of FINSA and Solutions
If there is any take-away from the Huawei-3Leaf situation, it is
that the factor method does not provide enough guidance as to
who will be subject to CFIUS review.99 Just as Huawei argued
that its take-over of 3Leaf is not within the jurisdiction of CFIUS
as they interpreted the U.S. code, many other companies in the
future may try to bypass the voluntary CFIUS application
process.ico
Additionally, the voluntary application review process is not
ideal for national security concerns. As companies become more
aggressive, and if sensitive data is at risk, an ex post facto
divestment approach does little to protect national security.'0
With hackers having the ability to steal thousands of files in single
breach incidents,'0 2 sensitive U.S. technology can easily be
publications/article.asp?id=10499.
97 See FLICKER & PARSONS, supra note 91, at 2 (noting that "China's Ministry of
Commerce has repeatedly complained that the U.S. government is using the CFRUS
process as a pretext for dampening Chinese investment in the United States").
98 Shayndi Raice & Andrew Dowell, Huawei Drops US. Deal Amid Opposition,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl00014240527487034073
04576154121951088478.html (noting that "[i]n a brief statement, Huawei said the
controversy surrounding the issue led it to change its mind. 'This was a difficult
decision, however we have decided to accept the recommendation of CFIUS to withdraw
our application to acquire specific assets of 3Leaf,' the company said").
99 See Gavioli, supra note 65, at 29-30.
100 See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also FLICKER & PARSONS, supra
note 91, at 2 (stating that CFIUS staff "had to take the unusual (though not
unprecedented) step of 'inviting' Huawei to file a notice of the transaction after the
fact"); Gavioli, supra note 65, at 37.
101 See DERRICK SPOONER ET AL., CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV, SPOTLIGHT ON: INSIDER
THEFT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSIDE THE U.S. INVOLVING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
OR ORGANIZATION 4, 7-9 (2009), available at www.cert.org/archive/pdf/
CyLabForeignTheftlP.pdf (describing how corporate insiders can steal information and
expressing the difficulty of retrieving that information once it goes abroad),
102 See Hackers Steal French Ministry Information, VOANEWS, March 6, 2011,
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/economy-and-business/Hackers-Steal-French-
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accessed within a few days after acquisition; the divestment
remedy as requested in the 3Leaf situation does little to secure this
sensitive data.103
To resolve this issue, as some scholars have suggested, one
could simply add more factors to be considered under the current
list.'04 Such a method puts more foreign investors on notice that
CFIUS could potentially step in on the transaction by making
more factors applicable to a particular transaction.'s However, as
exhibited by the 3Leaf incident, such a proposal does not go far
enough because it remains fallible to lawyer's interpretations as
what transaction falls within the scope of the enumerated
factors.0 6
Moreover, by analyzing the various businesses in which
CFIUS has taken interest, for example, 3Leaf and 3Com (server
technology), Dubai Ports (shipping port management), Fujistu-
Fairchild (semiconductor industry), it is difficult for foreign
investors to determine what industry falls within "national
security."'o7 While the factor method enables CFIUS to have an
expansive reach, with some criticizing the factors as giving CFIUS
too broad of a reach,' FINSA, along with the lack of
congressional guidance, allows CFIUS to declare almost every
sector of U.S. commerce as being vital to "national security." 0 9
As currently regulated, CFIUS can potentially presume that "every
critical sector of the U.S. industry should be kept in the hands of
home-country citizens or business,"' giving potential foreign
Finance-Ministry-Information-I 17521708.html.
103 See Lolita C. Baldor & Robert Bums, Pentagon Says Hackers Accessed 24,000
Files, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 15, 2011, http://articles.boston.com/20i11-07-
15/news/29778211_1pentagon-data-terrorist-group-defense-industry; see also Michael
Riley & John Walcott, China-Based Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-13/china-
based-hacking-of-760-companies-reflects-undeclared-global-cyber-war.htm (describing
how China based hackers broke into 760 U.S. companies and acquired sensitive
information).
104 See Gavioli, supra note 65, at 40.
105 See id at 40.
106 See Weisman, supra note 86.
107 See Gavioli, supra note 65, at 29.
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investors no guidance on whether their investment will be subject
to CFIUS review.
Lastly, both the 3Leaf and the 3Com incidents illuminate the
polar ends of the spectrum of political threat CFIUS can present.
The 3Com incident demonstrates how political pressure can bring
national attention to such a transaction, which can ultimately serve
as a positive force to augment national security."' However, as
companies grow bolder and challenge the authority of CFIUS
determinations, the President may become pitted against both
Congress and foreign governments.1 12 As shown by the 3Leaf
deal, the President had to be cautious in protecting U.S. trade
relations with China, while at the same time protecting relations
with Congress."' If Huawei had not agreed to divest, the
President would have had two options: (1) force divestment, thus
pleasing Congress and displeasing China, or (2) approve the
transaction, pleasing China, but displeasing Congress and
exposing himself to political criticism regarding his national
security policy." 4 As exemplified by the boldness of Huawei in
the 3Leaf transaction, national security can become a politicized
issue outside the context of congressional attention under CFIUS.
V. Proposed Solution
Prior to presenting a solution to some of the problems exposed
by the 3Com and 3Leaf incidents, several concessions must be
noted. First, CFIUS is undoubtedly influenced by politics; many
have criticized it as being over politicized."' However, under the
I See FLICKER & PARSONS, supra note 91, at 1.
112 See id. at 2.
113 Id. (noting that presidential review of the 3Leaf transaction would have
"presented a thorny political problem for the White house, which would likely have gone
to great lengths to avoid offending the Chinese government"). The article also noted that
China's Ministry of Commerce has repeatedly complained that the U.S.
government is using the CFRUS process as a pretext for damping Chinese
investment in the United States. And China has recently unveiled, to significant
press and industry attention, its own foreign investment review process, part of
a new wave of such measures also recently proposed or enacted in other
countries, including Frances and Italy.
Id. Thus, because of worldwide attention on these transaction, a country's
determination of a particular transaction could have future trade consequences.
114 See supra Part III.B.
115 See Gavioli, supra note 65, at 33-36.
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current framework, such an unpoliticized solution is not possible
since both Congress and the President play a vital role in
regulating CFIUS."6 Second, the historical discussion of CFIUS
shows that CFIUS is an evolving organization. Keeping in mind
these two factors, the proposal below is not intended to be an end
all solution, nor is it meant to be seen as a complete solution to all
the problems illuminated by the 3Com and 3Leaf deals. However,
given the potential impact of a solution, warding off danger and
increasing national security, even a small step forward is a
worthwhile consideration.
Broadly speaking, the proposal here suggests that to address
the issues exposed by the 3Com and 3Leaf deals, CFIUS should
adopt a "list" approach. The list method is conceptually simple.
Under this approach, the CFIUS committee, using the factors
outlined by statute, would create a list of companies it deems as
being vital to national security.' 7 Thereafter, these companies
would be notified of their status on the list. Once a company has
been notified, the CEO of the company must notify CFIUS any
time that company is engaged in a transaction that might subject
the company to foreign control.
In creating this list, the Committee must take steps to assure
that the list method is not abused. First, the Committee must be as
specific as possible when putting companies on the list."' Second,
the Committee must be able to point to a statutory element or
category of industry to which the company belongs. Third, the
Committee may create additional categories of industry that are
vital to national security, but must do so with great discretion.
Fourth, the Committee must be as specific as possible in creating
these categories and must justify the creation of each one.
A possible criticism of the list method is the stigma attached to
being on the list. Companies might be concerned that being on
this list renders them less desirable and thus less likely to receive
other buyout bids." 9  However, the list method does not
116 See, e.g., id.
117 See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
121 Stat. 246 (codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170).
118 This means that the Committee cannot put all of IBM on the list; rather, it must
list a particular division of IBM that it deems vital.
119 Seesupra Part II.C.I.
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functionally alter anything; if companies are deemed vital to
national security, they would be subject to CFIUS review
regardless. Furthermore, while being put on the list may repel
buyout offers, it does not entirely preclude them.'20 Lastly, a
secretive ex ante approach to the list could help avoid any negative
publicity caused by the CFIUS review, thus helping the U.S.
company preserve its image.
With such principles to guide the Committee, a list method
alleviates some of the problems CFIUS currently faces. Primarily,
by requiring the CFIUS committee to create a list of vital
companies or national security activities, the Committee is forced
to flesh out the concept of "national security" and "homeland
security" to a much greater extent than is currently required.
Additionally, the Committee is forced to apply the factors listed in
the statutes prior to any transaction, ensuring the Committee's
understanding of the reach and importance of each factor will
increase.
The list method further gives greater notice to companies
about their importance to U.S. national security. Because any
company on the list is required to notify CFIUS of the proposed
merger transaction, CFIUS will have appropriate time to review
the proposal. If 3Leaf had been on the list, it would not have
completed the transaction with Huawei prior to seeking CFIUS
review.12 ' As noted above, while it only takes a few minutes to
acquire information that could jeopardize national security, this
method would reduce the likelihood that companies could acquire
sensitive information through the divestment remedy to a rejected
transaction.
By no means is the list meant to be determinative of whether
or not a company is vital to national security, nor is it meant to
supplant CFIUS's current functioning method. Rather the list
method is only meant to supplement the current framework;
CFIUS will still have flexibility in its jurisdiction by retaining
discretion to interpret "national security" and "homeland security"
concerning overlooked or newly formed industries. Therefore,
using the list method with a combination of the current framework
will curb the criticism of CFIUS as being too erratic due to a lack
120 See id.
121 See supra Part I.B.
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of guidance.
Additionally, the list approach seems more politically neutral
than the current approach for two primary reasons. First, since the
regulation would apply to all foreign countries, it would be
difficult for foreign countries to claim the United States is
specifically targeting any particular nation's companies.122
Secondly, the list method reduces any potential bias of the
Committee because, in the ex ante approach, the Committee's
decision to deem an entity or technology as vital to national
security will not be influenced by the nature of the acquiring
company and its national affiliation.123 Consequently, rather than
targeting certain transactions by companies associated with certain
foreign countries, this method appears more politically
appropriate, at least on the face of it. Practically, if a president is
ever asked to make a determination on the approval or rejection of
a transaction, his decision would appear to be less politically
motivated, instead appearing as justified by the neutral operating
mechanism of CFIUS.
However, one of the most frequent criticisms of CFIUS under
the current statutory scheme has been that CFIUS's transaction
review has been highly politicized.124 Undoubtedly, Congress has
brought much attention to particular transactions through public
criticism, which some refer as the fire-alarm method.12 5 However,
that method can often lead to false alarms, especially when
legislators sounding the alarms do not have as much information
as the agencies.126 The solution proposed above does not address
this criticism, and serves as a clear limitation. Nevertheless, as
noted above, there always will be an inherent political process in
CFIUS due to the involvement of the President and the
Congressional Reporting requirement.127  Because completely
depoliticizing the CFIUS process is not feasible, any proposed
122 See FLICKER & PARSONS, supra note 91, at 2 (noting "China's Ministry of
Commerce has repeatedly complained that the U.S. government is using the CFIUS
process as a pretext for damping Chinese investment in the United States.").
123 But see id. (noting skepticism of this impartiality).
124 See Gavioli, supra note 65, at 33-36.
125 Sullivan, supra note 23, at 203-33.
126 Id. at 204.
127 Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional
Involvement Is Too Much, 93 IOWA L. REv. 325, 352 (2007).
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solution, even one which directly addresses political influence on
the CFIUS process, will suffer this same infirmity.
Any proposal for change must be viewed within the larger
framework of government functioning. CFIUS has been a system
in evolution for more than four decades,'28 and the system has
strived to fit modern security concerns.'2 9 Admittedly, the system
is not perfect. However, a proposal for a more drastic overhaul of
CFIUS would have difficulty garnering political approval, whereas
a proposal for small changes to the administration of the CFIUS is
not likely to encounter this difficulty.'30 Furthermore, small
administrative changes such as the list method proposed in this
paper may not have to get political approval at all so long as they
fit within the current statutory framework.'"' Thus, the list method
proposal would be more politically practical than a proposal
suggesting a large overhaul of the CFIUS framework.
VI. Conclusion
The events of September 11th have made the United States
cognizant of the need to ensure national security. However, the
mechanism developed to protect the United States from
informational security threats has been evolving since the 1980s.'32
The latest incidents involving the Huawei-3Com'3 3 and Huawei-
128 See Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975), reprinted as note under
15 U.S.C. §78b (2000) (as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1981)).
129 See Foreign Investment & National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
§§2-7(b), 8-10, 121 Stat. 246, 259 (2007) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. §2170 (2000));
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §5021, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §2070(a)(2000)) at 2170(g); Exec. Order
No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988).
130 See generally Gavioli, supra note 65, at 33-36 (noting that CFIUS is inherently
politicized).
131 Based on my interpretation of the statutory framework, the list method proposal
would not require legislative approval and could be initiated as an administrative
procedure unilaterally enacted by the CFIUS Committee.
132 See Foreign Investment & National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
§§2-7(b), 8-10, 121 Stat. 246, 259 (2007) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. §2170 (2000));
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §5021, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §2070(a)(2000)) at 2170(g); Exec. Order
No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988).
133 See supra Part III.A.
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3Leafl 34 transactions illustrate that there is room for improvement.
As currently designed, CFIUS can be undermined by a foreign
investor that fails to notify CFIUS of its pending transaction.
CFIUS's reach and jurisdiction can be questioned by foreign
investors, and the ex post divestment fails to protect the nations
information security.'3 5 However, with the use of a list method,
CFIUS can address some of these concerns by ex ante notifying
companies that CFIUS considers them vital to national security,
thus ensuring that CFIUS can review transactions prior to giving
the foreign company a chance to acquire sensitive information.13 6
Furthermore, with a more ex ante approach, the targeting method
is arguable more neutral and less influenced by bias, making the
President's decision seem slightly less political. While the list
method is not a complete fix to CFIUS-it does not present a
solution to the criticism that the CFIUS method is overly
political-the list approach is a progressive step toward securing
the nation against threats from foreign investors.
134 See supra Part III.B.
135 See SPOONER ET AL., supra note 101, at 2-5; FLICKER & PARSONS, supra note 91,
at 1; HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 58, at 48.
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